

obligations to France, and that we could not recognize any new arrangement arrived at without us. These declarations, though they asked no questions, were intended to produce assurances from Berlin, but no response was sent. When the news reached London on July 18 that Kiderlen had presented unacceptable demands to France, including the most valuable portion of the French Congo, Grey confided his anxieties to Metternieh, who was unable to give him any information.

On July 21, Mr. Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer, made a resounding declaration at the Mansion House, the terms of which were approved by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary but were not seen by the Cabinet. If Britain were to be treated, where her interests were vitally affected, as if she were of no account, " then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure." Neither Germany nor Morocco was mentioned, but the warning was plain enough. It was precisely the same claim to be considered that the Kaiser had voiced at Tangier, and it produced a similar reaction. A contingent declaration of war was flung across the North Sea. In German eyes England seemed as eager to thwart the colonial and commercial ambitions of Germany as to encourage those of France. After a day or two of dangerous tension, during which Grey believed that the fleet might be attacked at any moment, a reassuring message arrived from the Wilhelmstrasse. Wearisome negotiations between France and Germany, in which England took no part, continued throughout the summer and autumn, and on November 4 the Morocco and Congo treaties were signed in Berlin. France secured the assent of Germany to the establishment of a Protectorate in

Morocco, while Germany received moderate territorial compensation in the French Congo. Both Governments pretended to be satisfied, but it was generally felt that in the second Morocco crisis, as in the first, the French had scored. Cailkux, the French Premier, and Jules Cambon, the Ambassador in Berlin, had served France well.

Never since the days of the Kruger telegram had Anglo-German relations been so strained as in the summer of 1911, and never since the creation of the *Entente Cordiale* had Anglo-French relations so closely resembled an alliance. Yet neither London nor Berlin desired a break, and in February, 1912, Lord Haldane visited Berlin to explore the ground, each side believing that the initiative had come from the other. He